On the two scenarios presented to illustrate moral instincts:
The reading posits that the decision in second scenario is easier to arrive at partly because acting on it requires less time and effort and is more detached from the subjects of the act.
In scenario one, the doctor could possibly kill the donor as means to greater good. In scenario two, the train operator could kill the lone hiker as a consequence of greater good. The reading posits that a rawlsian creature would find the decision in scenario two permissible for this reason.
While I agree, I can't help but suspect that in addition to that, the moral-ness and non-moral-ness (or lack of information on the moral nature) of what brings the donor to the hospital and what brings the lone hiker to the detour track also carries some weight in helping along the conscious reasoning phase of the process.
Scenario one has the potential receiver of the doctor's action taking a morally permissible action to donate blood. This is what brings him to the hospital. We aren't provided with moral context, if any, that led to the other five ending up in critical condition in the hospital but knowing that the donor is at the hospital to perform a morally permissible act has to have triggered moral emotions of gratitude and perhaps even compassion in the doctor in helping rationalize his decision not the sacrifice the donor in favor of the five in critical condition.
That and the fact that it's probably super-illegal to harvest the donor's organs without his knowledge or permission. Ha!
Scenario two has all hikers on both tracks partaking in action that, though not containing a clear moral element, flies in the face of common sense. I think this might, on an unconscious level, be part of what makes the decision much easier to sacrifice the lone hiker on the detour track in favor of the others in this scenario.
While I'm not saying that the decision to take darwin's law into one's own hands is ever a just decision, in a scenario like this (as posited in the reading) exceptions or variations will often be made. Faced with a moral dilemma brought about by people doing something that, while not morally wrong, is universally considered to be unwise, I think, for most people, coming to a utilitarian decision is much easier.
As it stands, the train operator isn't given a reason why any of the hikers are on the tracks. The doctor at least gets a reason for the donor's visit and it likely colors his view of the donor favorably even if in the time he's given to arrive at a decision, he doesn't realize it. In the hypothetical world where he doesn't ever have to worry about losing his doctoring license, he could, as a Kantian creature, reach a quick decision to sacrifice the donor but as a Humean creature, knowledge of the nature of the donor's visit will likely slow the process by triggering his emotions. According to Kant, emotions are icky.
There could be a host of reasons why the lone hikers and the groups of hikers are on the train tracks but the train operator is never given this information. What would happen if in this increasingly hypothetical world, each scenario was altered by 1) having the donor actually not be a donor but a deadly fugitive who ends up at the hospital after leading marshals on a nationwide chase during which he kills five civilians and 2) having the train operator recognize the lone hiker as nobel prize winner Gregory House, MD and soon-to-be inventor of a cure for cancer just as soon as his findings get published? (the train operator in this scenario is an avid fan of the scientific community).
On a more serious note, these two scenarios got me thinking about less hypothetical, real-world proxies that I experience or hear about everyday. The first example I can think of is what I believe to be legitimately unjust police violence exercised on people of color in recent months. I've both witnessed and gotten into a few arguments with people who hold the belief that a mixture of darwin's law and reasoning similar to Kant's are the reasons why the deaths of so many like Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, and Freddie Gray were inevitable and even justified.
The Tamir Rice killing in particular, bears a few similarities to the second scenario. The officer, like the train operator, had little information on RIce beyond what he saw on the scene (which, from my viewing of the video, wasn't reason enough for the officer to shoot within two seconds) because the dispatcher withheld important details from him like the fact that the caller stated that the gun was probably a toy gun and he probably wasn't an adult. People argue that the officer - Timothy Loehmann, established already by a previous employer as unfit and mentally unstable for police work - was concerned about the well-being of the other people in the park and had to make a decision.
Here's where I think the reading comes in. Elsewhere in the reading, it is evident that every hypothesis and every finding and every scenario stated is contingent on universal moral principles that can be only modified by different cultures through variations and exceptions - principles like the one of child murder being unacceptable. Taking from what I read, I come to the sad conclusion that many adhere to a culture that 1) Blindly defends law enforcement officers in all things, even the ones already declared unfit and mentally unstable for police work and 2) view children of color as adults. In a culture such as this, it is genuinely scary to me what we can justify as morally permissible.
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